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INTRODUCTION 
No Catholic philosopher, in as much as he is a Catholic, 
can deny that God is infinite or that this infinity may be 
proven trom reason. As a philosopher, however, he mayor 
may not construe a proof which will with certitude prove the 
infinity of God. He may, moreover, fail to see precisely 
what is the nature of this infinity. The purpose of this 
paper is to consider the philosophical treatment of infinity 
as presented by Francis Suarez, S.l. The paper will present 
the concept of infinity as understood by Suarez and his 
proofs for the actual infinity of God, and will endeavor to 
give a criticism of the position of Suarez. 
Owing to the diffe~ence between the philosophy of St. 
Thomas and that of Suarez it is sometimes questioned whether 
or not Suarez can prove that God is infinite. The points 
which give rise to this question are the different concepts 
of being, of act and potency, and the different principles 
which follow on these concepts. The chief proof which Tho-
mists employ for the infinity of God is based on a principle 
of act and potency, namely that an act Which is not received 
into a potency is without limit, infinite. Since Suarez 
1 
2 
does not hold that an act can be limited only by potency, 
.' it is doubted whether he can prove infinity. Even Thomists, 
however, use other arguments to demonstrate that God is in-
finite, especially the argument from creation. But here 
again, since the fact of creation and the consequent reason-
ing to infinity cannot be demonstrated without making use 
of the concepts of act and potency and of being itself, 
Thomists question the validity of the Suare~ian approach. 
Before actually getting into the matter it seems well 
to recall what infinity means. Infinite means not finite, 
not limited. The notion is first had from an analogy with 
quantity, which we know from experience as having actual 
limitation. A stick Which is three feet long has a certain 
positive extension. When compared with a stick six feet in 
length it is seen to lack something, to be limited. 'lio this 
concept of limitation the intellect can prefix a negative 
and arrive at the concept of non-limitation. 
This concept of non'-limitation, however, is not re-
stricted to the genus of quantity, but may be applied to 
+ ~ 
other perfections and even to being itself. One white object 
compared with a brighter object may be said to lack a certain 
whiteness. ]'rom this notion of limited whiteness the mind 
can rise to the concept of unlimited, or infinite, whiteness. 
A stone when oompared with a man is oertainly seen t~'laok 
something of being that the man has, to be limited. From 
this the mind oan rise to the oonoept of infinite being. 
3 
These few examples, however, are not enough to give an 
understanding of infinity. There are various interpretations 
whioh ought to be taken into oonsideration. A certain being 
may be infinite, that is, laok all terms or limits, and yet 
be naturally destined to have limits. Such, for example, is 
prime matter, whioh is said to be infinite privative, that 
is, in virtue of the privation of the limits whioh it is or-
dained to have. In opposition to this infinity is infinity 
negative s~ta, the infinity of a being whioh is in no way 
destined to have limits. 
There is categorematio and sy~oategorematio infinity. 
That being is syncategorematically infinite which is limited 
with respect to the act which it has now, but which can have 
this act increased ad infinitum. A six inch line, for ex-
ample, has a definite, limited extension, but its extension 
can be added to without limit. A being is categorematioally 
infinite if the aot. which it has here and now is absolutely 
wi thout limit. 
Finally there is intensive and extensive infinity. Ex-
tensive infinity may be predicated of a passive, or an active 
potenoy. 
4 
Prime matter, for example, is extensively infinite 
.' beoause it is in potenoy to an infinite number of forms. The 
omnipotenoe of God is extensively infinite beoause it oan pro-
duoe an infinite number of effeots. It must be noted, of 
oourse, that, sinoe God is Pure Aot, there is no suoh thing 
as His being in potenoy to these various effeots. Finally 
the perfeotion of God is extensively infinite in So far as 
it embraces eminently all the possible perfections of crea-
tures. Intensive infinity, on the other hand, is the infinity 
of an act, precisely in so far as it is an act. 
The infinity Which we predicate of God must be that of 
~ itself, not merely of quantity or some quality. It must 
be oategorematic. It must be infinity negative sumpta. And 
while God is extensively infinite, He must also be shown to 
be intensively infinite. Nor is this postulate a prejudicing 
of the question; as will be seen, Suarez himself demands that 
such be the infinity of God. 
.' 
CHAPTER I 
INFINITY IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
To examine the position ot all the philosophers who 
preceded Suarez would hardly be in place in such a paper 
as this. It will be sutticient to present the notions or 
several men who may be oonsidered as having speoial intluenoe 
on the Scholastio Philosophy which Suarez protessed. 
The true conoept ot the nature ot God and His intinity 
seems to be peculiar to Christians, that is, to Christian 
philosophers, who tirst peroeived God to be subsistent be-
ing. Beginning with Plato we tind that the pagans never 
arrived at the oonoept ot a Being who oould say ot himselt: 
"I am Who am." It the question could be put to Plato, it 
seems certain that he would reply that there is one supreme 
being, but it is not at all oertain that this supreme being 
would be, in his mind, the only divine being. In the Timaeus 
he tells us ot a god who is the tather and oause ot the uni-
1 " 
Terse, who brought order into disorder. This in itselt im-
plies oertaln orderless matter whioh does not have its 
1 Plato, Timaeus, Loeb Classioal Library, Putnam's Sons, 
New York, 1929, 28 . 6. 
5 
6 
existence from the supreme being. He goes on, moreov~, to 
/ tell us that there are other, sidereal gods which the first 
2 
god produced. Such a first cause as this, whatever Plato 
may have thought about it, oan hardly possess an iffinity 
of being. However, we are hardly justified in saying thet 
this deity is the god which Plato would have professed in 
the tinal analysis, since the question as to just what Plato 
3 
wanted his god to be is hotly disputed even by eminent scholars. 
But even though' it is not certain what the god of Plato aO-
tually is, nor whether he ever actually affirmed or denied 
infinity of the supreme being, it does seem certain that he 
could never have rightly held a god who was truly intinite 
in the realm of being, since " ••• for,Plato, there is no sense 
4 
of the word being reserved exclusively for God." Sinoe he 
did not hold that all beinas come from .Q!! Being alone, tha t 
is, since he did not hold that creation was necessary, he 
could not have held real infinity. 
Having said what Plato could not have held it would be 
well to endeavor to give what he did hold, but, owing to tbB 
allegorical way of speaking that he used and to the variant 
2 Ibid. 41 A~. 
3 J:iGilson, The Spirit ot Mediaeval Philosophy, Scribner's 
Sons, New Yon, 19B6, 47-49. 
4 Ibid. 48. 
-
7 
opinions that seem to run through his works, this is iot easy. 
Perhaps, if we trust Aristotle to have understood his pre-
decessor, we get a gleam of his thought by considering what 
Aristotle has to say about it. We are told in the Physics 
that Plato, along ~th the Pythagoreans, "regarded the un-
limited, or undetermined, as existing in itself, and not as 
being a condition incident to something else, but having its 
5 
own independent substantive existence." This would indicate 
that he was at least on the right track, but what Aristotle 
further tells us only brings us back to a contused notion. 
For he says that Plato found the unlimited both in sense 
6 
objects and in the Ideas. Aristotle apparently thinks that 
Plato made no discrimination between the lack of determination 
in material objects, and infinity i~ spiritual beings. It 
this is true it would seem that he not only could not have 
proven an infinite god, but didn't even have the proper con-
cept of infinity. 
While Aristotle's language is clearer, and free from 
allegory, so that it is easier to determine what he meant to 
. " 
say, still he does not seem to have gone beyond Plato in con-
ceiving the notion of God. He did come to the conclusion 
5 Aristotle,. Physics, Loeb Classical Library, Putnam's 
Sons, New York, 1929, III, iv, 203 A. 
6 ~., 203 A. 
8 
that there had to be some immutable substanoe, some ~nmoved 
mover. This substanoe had to be infinite because "it causes 
motion for an infinite time, and nothing finite has an in-
7 
finite potentiality." However, he went on to reason to the 
8 
existenoe of at least fifty-five such substances, so that 
for no one of them could he rightly claim real infinity. In 
spite of the tremendous advances Which he made over his pre-
decessors he seems to have remained "profoundly impregnated 
9 
with polytheism." This is oertainly reason enough for say-
ing that he could not prove an infinite god in the proper 
sense. In addition to this, however, he seems, like Plato, 
never to have had a correot concept of infinity. "The fact 
• 
is," he says, "that the unlimited is really the exaot opposite 
of its usual desoription; for it is not that beyond whioh 
there is nothing, but that of whioh there is always more 
10 
beyond." 
Plotinus, in t~e third century atter Christ, expressly 
declared that the One was infinite, because the One not only 
could in no way be measured, but also was the source of in-
11 
exhaustible and inconceiyable energy. However, he too was 
7 Aristotle, Metaphysios, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard 
University Press,=tOnaon, 1935, XII, vii, 1073 A. 
8 Ibid. 1074 A. 
9 M.D.Roland-Gosselin, Aristote, Paris, 1938, p.97, oited 
by Gilson, p.40. 
10 Aristotle, Physics, III, vi, 207 A. 
11 P. Descoqs, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, Paris, 
1935, II, 011. 
9 
inclined to speak in metaphors, and so we do not kno~, just 
what he understood by infinity. His emanation of all thizgs 
12 
from the One, since it seem to be a necessary diffusion of 
the One, does not seem compatible with true infinity. Such 
an emanation, moreover, does not seem to leave creatures 
contingent, and without a contingent world it hardly seems 
13 
possible to have a God who is perfectly and absolutely being. 
Augustine, although he took much from the Platonists, 
went beyond them to arrive at the real understanding of in-
finity. Juat how he would prove the infinity of God the 
author has not been able to discover, but his proper under-
standing of it seems evident. He says that we must not 
attribute any mode to Gcd lest we seem to limit Him. How-
ever, we must not conceive Him as indetermined, since He is 
the cause of all determination in beings. This would seem 
equivalent to making Him unlimited, not merely in potency, 
but in act, and in the act of esse. Augustine goes on to 
-
say that we must not attribute any particular mode to God, 
for this might seem to say that He had received the perfection 
trom without. But:if we say that He is the absolute mode'," 
summum modum, then Augustine agrees that we are getting 
12 W. Turner, History of Philosophy, Ginn & Co., Boston, 
1929, 206. 
13 A. Pegis, §.i.:. Thomas ~ the Greeks, Marquette University 
Press, Milwaukee, 1939, 81. 
10 
somewhere near the truth. 14 
Finally in the thirteenth century came Thomas Aquinas 
who truly perceived the meaning of infinity, and who gave 
numerous proofs to demonstrate the ,infinity of God. The 
,. '0, 
two most important proofs are those based on Godts being 
esse sUbsistens and having the power of creation. God does 
not receive His being but simply ha, it from His Essence; 
He is !!!! sUbsistens. Since an act is limited only by po-
tency, this pure act of being is unlimited, infinite. It 
is in no way a passive potency, and so is not syncategorematic 
infinity, nor infinity privative sumpta. It is not quantity 
or quality, but simply ~, containing all perfections 
15 
eminently. God, moreover, created the world and all beings 
other than Himself. He produced them from no passive potency, 
but simply willed and they were. Before creation these bei~s 
were nothing, they were infinitely distant from their ~, 
"infinite distans ~ actu. tt To span such an infinite gap 
an infinite power is required. "Oportet factoris virtutem 
16 
~ infinitam." And since the power of God is one and 
the same.as His essence, and His essence is one with His 
14 Augustine, De Natura Boni, CXXII, t.VIII, Col 558, cited 
by L'Abbe ~es Martin, St. Augustine, Libraire Felix 
Alcan, Paris, 1923. 
15 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Marietti, Taurini, 1937,I,q.7 
16 T. Aquinas, Summa Contre Gentiles, Marietti, Taurini, 1894, 
Lib. 1, c .43. 
11 
existence, He is being without limit. 
Last of all in our historical sketch we treat Duns 
Scotus, Doctor Subtilis, who certainly does not belie his 
name in his exposition of the infinity of God. His method 
ot approach in proving the point is briefly presented by 
Gilson. 
, 
For Duns scotus, in fact, it is al-
together one and the same thing to 
prove the existenoe of God and to 
prove the existence of an infinite 
being ••• Duns Scotus starts, in fact, 
from the idea of being in order to 
prove that we must necessarily admit 
a first being; from the fact that it 
is first he deduces that it is un-
causable; from the fact that it is un-
causable he deduces that this first 
being exists necessarily. Passing on 
to the properties ••• he shows that it 
is efficient cause, endowed with in-
telligence and will, that its intelligence 
embraces the infinite, and that since 
this intelligence is. identical with its 
essence, 1;s essence also envelops the 
infinite. 
Though we grant to Scotus that there is a first, un-
caused, necessary, intelligent being there still remains a 
question: how do we know that the Divine Intellect embraces 
the infinite? His answer is: "Intelligibilia sunt infinita 
in potentia respectu intellectus creati, satis patet; !i 1A 
intellectu increato ~ simul omnia intellecta actu, quae 
17 E. Gilson, OPe cit. 56-7. 
12 
18 
~ creatp.~ successive intelligibilia." But is it so 
.' 
evident that there are infinite possibles to be known? SCotus 
replies: " ••• quodlibet ponendum!!1 possibile, cuius BQa 
19 
apparet impossibilitas ••• " and "infinitas ~ repugnat enti." 
To criticize briefly: the argument seen's to involve an il-
legitiffiate transit from the logical to the real. 
Scotus gives another argument from the human will, but 
he himself strews videtur so freely through the proof that 
it seems not altogether convincing even to him. 
Voluntas nostra omni finito aliquid 
majus potest appetere at amare ••• , et 
quod plus est, videtur inclinatio 
naturalis ad summe amandum bonum in-
finitum ••• Videtur ••• , si infinitum 
repugnaret bono, quod nullo modo 
voluntas quietatur in boDO sub r~tione 
infiniti, nec in illud facile tenderet."3) 
This argument, too, as it appears, relies on the supposition 
of the existence of the infinite. It would be interesting 
to push the analysis of this supposition farther, but for 
the present we will relinquish it, to touch on it again in 
the body of the paper. 
18 J. Duns ScotU8, opu~ Oxoniense, apud L. Vives, PariS, 
1893, I, d.2, q.2, ol.VIII, p.471. For a more complete 
treatment see ;J. Marechal, Le Point ~ Depart de la 
Metaphysigue, Felix Alcan, Paris, 1927, 150. 
19 Duns Scotus, 478-9, also Marechal, 152. 
20 Duns Scotus, 477, also Marechal, 150. 
.' 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINITION OF INFINITY ACCORDING TO SUAREZ 
That being is omnipertect who possesses in a~ equal or 
higher manner the perfections of all other beings. If a 
being is omniperfect, it is also extensively infinite; but 
it is not necessarily intensively infinite. It is true that 
God who is omnipertect is also intensively infinite, but it 
is not true that the concept of omnipertection includes the 
note of intensive infinity. 
Suarez, as we shall see, understood both omnipertection 
and intensive infinity; but' at times he seems to contuse the 
two, to make them identical. Why did he do this? The answer 
will be more evident, when we have-seen how he explained the 
two cO'ncepts and how one ot his proofs for the infinity of 
Go d proceeds. 
The infinity ot God was tor Suarez the intensive in-
finity we described in the Introduction. First of all it,~s 
taken from an analogy with quantity. " ••• ad modum corporum 
~ per proportionem ad ilIa apprehendimus !1 explicamus 
1 
reliqua omnia." We see bodies with definite extension and 
1 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysllcae, sPUd L~ Vi;ves, Paris, 
D. XXYIII, Sec.l, n.IS. 
13 
14 
weight. Some are smaller and lighter than others, a~d So 
we peroeive them to be limited. This notion of more and 
less taken from quantity is applied to other perfeotions 
and even to being. "Simili ergo analogia utimur ad deolaran-
dam perfeotionem entitativam ~ virtutem aotivarum rerum."2 
One being has more perfections than another, or has the 
same speoific perfeotion in a higher grade. "Apprehendimus 
enim ~ rebus guamdam veluti latitud1nem perfeotion1s entis 
3 in quo ~ var1i gradus ••• " And in this way we understand 
creatures to be limited. "Et unumquodque ~ intelligimus 
~ f1nitum !!! limitatum per quemdam proprium perfeotionis 
gradum."4 From this ooncept of limitation we rise to the 
oonoept of an unlimited being. ~:It hoo .!!!!!. vooamus inf1n1~ 
simplioiter, .!!.Q1! in guantitate molis, ~ 1!! excellentia 
perfectionis."5 It is preoisely in His ~ that He is in-
finite. "Nos dicere possumus, hihil aliud !!!! Deo infinitum 
6 ~e, guam ~ ipsYm Sllltl." 
The infinity of God was for Suarez infinity negative 
sumpta, not had in virtue of a privation of a due perfection.? 
2 Ibid. n.1S. 
3 'IOIQ. n.1S. 
4 I'6Tci. n.1S. 
5 Ibid. n.1S. 
6 I15IC! • n.1S. 
? 'IO'Ia. n.19. 
15 
It was the inf'inity 01' act, not potency; cat egoremat !'c , not 
syncategorematic: "Neque potest virtus ilIa ~ inf'inita 
sync at egoremat ice , quia simul et actu habet existentem t~ 
8 ~ virtutem !1 perfectionem." This is confirmed all the 
more by his proofs, which we will consider later. He is 
definitely out to prove that God is a pure, unlimited act 
in the realm of' being. 
In other texts, however, he seems to contuse infinity 
with omniperf'ection. "Unde in ea etiam continetur ilIa in-
---- - - - ----
f'initas ~e intelligitur in continentia omnis pertectionis 
9 possibilis vel cogitabilis." If this were the only in-
dication of' his contusing the two notions, it might be easily 
explained away, by saying that he simply meant to identity 
omniperf'ection and extensive infinity. But this is not the 
case. In the f'irst proof' he gives for infinity it is clear 
that he is confusing intensive infinity with omniperf'ection. 
The proof says in brief: God is infinite because His 
inf'inity is the same as His omniperfection. 
Imo hinc fit etiam consequens ut omnes . ~ 
rationes quibus supra probavimus per-
f'ectionem prim! entis, aeque probent in-
finitatem eius, quia et modus pertectionls 
8 Ibid. D.XX, Sec. 2, n.4. 
9 ~uarez, De Deo Uno et Trino, apud L. Vives, Paris, 1877, 
Tract. I, LlD.-rI,-C:l:-n.5. 
a nobis expositus convertitur cum in- .' 
finitate recte declarata et infinitas, 
quatenus sub ilIa negatione perfectionem 
indicat, pertinet ad perfectlonem 
simpliciter, atque adeo ad summam entis 
perfectionem.~O 
Before beginning this proof he states, explicitly that he 
intends to prove infinity as he has previously explained 
it, and not merely under one aspect. 
16 
In the section immediately preceding the treatment of 
infinity he explains and proves God's omniperfection. God's 
perfeotion oonsists in this, that He lacks no perfection that 
is due to Him and that He has all perfection there is to be 
had. "Atgue hoo modo illud ~ dicitur perfectum oui omnis 
perfeotio ita debita !!1, ~ necessario inest, ~ nulla ei 
omnino deesse possit, ~ privative B!2 negative, et utrogue 
1 
sensu dioitur .!!!!.! ~ essentia Dei, !!!!.! simpliciter perfeotum" 
God can laek no due perfeotion, "quia siout Deus ~ ~ ~, 
12 
ita ~ !! habet totam perteotionem sibi debitam." He also 
has all possible perfeotions, "quia ostensum est nihil esse 
13 - -
posse praeter ipsum, nisi ab 1pso." And whatever has God 
as cause must in some way be in ~od, that is, virtually ~~d 
eminently. 
10 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. XXX, Seo.2, n.21. 
11 Ibid. D.XXX, Sec.l, n.!. 
12 l'D1<l'. n.2. 
13 Ibid. n.4. 
17 
Later we will have more cause to investigate how' Suarez 
proves that all beings other than God proceed trom God as 
their cause, while God himself is, was, and always will be a 
necessary being. For the present we will take tor granted 
that this is proven, and simply question the fact of God's 
being infinite as a consequ~nce of being omniperfect. As tar 
as the aut~r can determine, Suarez argues not from the fact 
that God can lack no due perfection, but trom the fact that 
He has all possible perfections. 
Haec infinitas in nullo alio consistit, 
nisi in hoc quod perfectio pr~i entis, 
nec est ita praecisa ac definita ad 
unum genus perfectionum, quae nos in 
creaturis distingui videmus, ut illud 
solum includat, et non cetera omnia, eo 
eminentissimo modo qui ad summam per-
fectionem pertinere potest; neque etiam 
in singulis perfectionum generibus ita 
est limitata ad certum ali quem gradum 
definitum qui in participato ente in-
telligi possit, quin habeat perfectionem 
illam nobiliori et excellentiori modo 
quam possit a creatura participari, 
etiamsi magislit magis in infinitum 
participetur. 
This seems to me to say no more than that God has in an 
eminent manner every creature perfection. It says that He . 
. , 
is not limited to anyone genus of participated perfection, 
but this is not the same as saying that He is absolutely 
14 Ibid. D.XXX, Sec. 2, n.2l. 
- 18 
unlimited. He is referring to the perfections of th~se 
creatures which we know on this earth, and to the perfections 
of angels, provided there be such. The supposition is that 
these possible perfections are infinite. But how do we know 
that they are infinite? Certainly from. experience we do not 
know this, since we know only finite perfections, and would 
seem to know only that the number and variety of possible 
beings is indefinite. The possibles nay well exceed the 
capacity of our intellects as to their extent, but this does 
not prove that they are infinite. I do not see how we can 
postulate that the possibles are infinite until we prove that 
their cause is infinite, but this is precisely what remains 
to be proved. 
Had the argument been based on the fact that God can be 
without no perfection that is His due, there would still be 
.a difficulty. For it would still be necessary to prove that 
God actually should be infinite, before concluding that He 
cannot lack infinity. 
I think we can see now why Suarez seems to co~se th~ 
two notions. He would, I believe, see that the concept of 
omniperfection does not necessarily include the note of in-
finity. But, since he supposed the possibles to be infinite, 
he thought that a proof of omniperfection automatically gave 
19 
infinity, and so constantly identified the two when be treat-
ed them at the same time. 
This one proof has been considered apart from the others 
first of all because it serves very well to bring out what 
Suarez understood by infinity. Secondly it seems to miss the 
point; to suppose what it was intended to prove; and so hard-
ly deserves lengthy consideration. 
-CHAPTER III 
INFINITY OF GOD PROVED FROM 
THE NOTION OF ENS A SE 
.' 
nUnde ~ priori ostenditur infinitas virtutis ~ infinitate 
essentiae, et a posteriori, infinitas essentiae ~ intinitate 1-- . 
virtutis." Thus Suarez points out the twofold method of 
approach he will use. There is no vicious circle invol*e4 
in the statement, as might appear at first glance. He means 
that from the nature, or the essence of God, to w~ich he has 
reasoned in a previous di$JUtation. he will show that God must 
be infinite, that is, that an !B! ~ ~ must be absolutely un-
limited. Secondly, from one ~ the effects of the Divine 
Power, namely creation, which he believes to have been proven, 
he will demonstrate that the cause-must be infinite. 
That the foundation tor proving God's infinity is His 
aseity, His being !!!! subsistens, Suarez repeats again and 
. again. "Dicere possumus nihil aliud ~ ~ esse infinitum 
. 2 quam.!!!!! ipsum ~, !!!!! ~ per essentiam." ".!!Q.2 ipso ~ 
est ~~ per essentiam ••• includit ~ perfectionem quae 
1 Ibid. D.XXX, 8ec.2, n.l. 
2 l'6"!'(t. D.XXVllJ:.~ StG~. :l" .ri.lS. 
2'1 
3 !!! ~ simp1ioiter infinitum." But why is an!.!!! ~,!!!., a 
necessary being, infinite? Aristotle, Plato, and other 
Greeks held neoessary beings, that is, each held that there 
were several necessary beings, and thus evidently did not con-
sider infinity as immediately consequent on neoessity. 
Suarez gives two proofs to demonstrate that !B! ~ ~ is 
necessarily infinite, one of which he explains as ~ posteriori, 
the other as ~ priori. As a matter of fact they coincide in 
an important point to make one proof. The second proof is 
more properly an ~ priori demonstration of .the validity of 
the Minor of the first syllogism. Put briefly the argument 
goes something like this. Participated, or limited, being is 
limited for one of three reasons, -perhaps for all three 
reasons. Either the efficient oause limits by deciding to 
give so muc~ and no more, or the being is received into a 
passive, real potency, or it is of itself, by virtue of its 
essence, intrinseca1ly limited. God, however, Who has been 
proven !B! ~!! can be limited in none of these ways, and so 
is infinite. 
Potest probari ••• , quia esse per 
essentiam non habet unde 1imitetur; 
esse enim participatum 1imitar1 potest 
aut ex voluntate dantis tantam per-
feot10nem et non majorem, aut ex 
3 Ibid. D.XXX, Sec. 2, n.20. 
capacitate recipientis, sive illa .' 
capaoitas intelligatur per modum 
passivae poteat1ae, sive tantum per 
modum objectivae, seu non repugnantiae; 
in primo autem ente, quod ex se est suum 
esse, nullum principium aut ra4io 
limitationis intelligi potest. 
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We can readily concede that a being which is uncaused 
and has being by virtue of its essence is neither limited by 
an efficient cause, nor by being received into a passive 
potency; and we can concede that God is suoh a being. But 
how do we know that there is no intrinsic limitation in such 
a being? The answer to this question is the. core of the 
proof. Suarez has several answers ready for us, which seem 
capable of division into two general classes, which he would 
again call ~ priori and ~ posteriori. 
The ~ posteriori arguments are given in answer to an 
objection which Suarez thinks someo#8 may propose. 
Dices, siout prtmum ens ex se est, ita 
ex se, et sine alia causa esse posse 
limitatum ad certum genus vel gradum 
perfectionis. Respondetur hoc repugnare 
enti necessario ab intrinseco et ex se 
habenti esse. Quod quidem a postesiori 
et ab incommodis probari potest ••• 
Prior to this objection Suarez has given no reason why ~ A 
se oannot be intrinsecally limited, but has Simply stated 
4 Ibid. 8ec.2, n.22. 
5 lb"ra. 1l.22. 
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that it cannot. Th~ reply to this objection, then, ie the 
first proof. But we sense a difficulty before we even come 
to the proof, for the objection is not really one against in-
finity. It is that too, but it is primarily an objection 
against omniperfection. As a result, this objection may be 
well answered, but in such a way that we still will not have 
infinity proven, but only omniperfection. 
Here again Suarez does fail to perceive the difference 
between proving infinity and omniperfection. He gives three 
reasons why God cannot be limited to om genus or one grade 
of the perfections we know in creatures. Each demonstrates 
only that God is omniperfect. "Quodeumque ~ habens lim1tatam 
perfeetionem, et quasi partem entis, potest ~ primo ~ 
6 
manare." Granted that this is true, all that follows is 
that God has all the perfections of all possible creatures 
in an eminent way. For the statement says merely that; there 
is one Supreme Being who alone is the source of whatever else 
is, or can be; and it still remains to be proven that the 
possibles actually are infinite. MOreover, Suarez himself 
holds that the infinity of the possibles is syncategorematic. 
"In ~ ~ possunt ~ ~ syncategorematice infinita."7 
6 Ibid. D.XXX, See. 2,n.22. 
7 F. Suarez, ~ Incarnatione, apud L. Vives, Paris, 1877, 
D. XXVI, Sec. 4, n. 12. 
24 
It would seem impossible, then, even though he should give 
.' 
a demonstration for the infinity of the possibles, to argue 
to oategorematic infinity for their oause. 
His second reason for denying the possibility of intrin-
sic limitation is that a being limited to one type or grade 
of perfection would not be completely perfect. "Tale ens non 
---a 
esset summe perfectum." And since it has already been 
demonstrated that there must be a first being who possesses 
all perfection, it follows that this being must be without 
limitation in perfection. But just what limitation in per-
fection must be denied? A being who is proven to be the 
cause of every single existing, or possible perfection cer-
tainly cannot be limited to anyone perfection or to any group, 
but must possess them all; but it does not follow that he is 
simply infinite until it has been proven that the possible 
perfections and beings are infinite. 
The third reason which Suarez lists as ~ posteriori seems 
more properly called ~ priori, but it labors under the same 
difficulty as the other two. He argues that if the first 
being, that is, a necessary being were limited in the way the 
objection limited it, there would be no repugnance in having 
a F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. XXX, Sec. 2, n. 22. 
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9 
innumerable neoessary beings. Aotually, however, th~re oan-
not be but one neoessary being, (his reasoning for one 
neoessary being will be oonsidered in the next ohapter), and 
so that one being must be unlimited. 
We reoall that the objeotion was aimed against omniper-
feotion. The third reason is a reply to that objeotion. For 
if there is a neoessary being who does . not possess all the 
perfeotions that we aotually know to be possible, then there 
must be at least one other neoessary being who oan oause the 
perfeotions not oontained by the,:t:f:Dst. And if there oan be 
more than one, there would seem to be no reason why there 
should not be several. 
But does this reasoning demonstrate that the first being 
must be absolutely infinite? Judg~ng from the context, we oan 
say that Suarez does not intend to prove any more than omnip~­
fection, that is, he intends to prove omnipert8otion, and t~s 
it for granted that he thus proves infinity.. For he plaoes 
it on a par with other two reasons already oonsidered, making 
no explioit statement that it has further implioations th&n 
the other two. Furthermore, sinoe he does frequently identify 
the two notions in his proofs, there is no oonolusive reason 
9 1,lli. n.22. 
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for thinking that he does otherwise in this plaoe. 
.' 
There remains another oonsideration. Perhaps, even 
though Suarez does not explioitly say so, this reason is in 
itself suffioient to demonstrate more than omniperfection. 
This will bear oonsiderable inYestigation. First of ~ll, we 
oan oertainly say that oontingent, ~inite beings of their 
very nature allow the possibility of numerous individuals of 
the same speoies. It is also evident that a being whioh is 
infinite in its very ~ must be one and only one. The oon-
tingent beings permitmultiplioation beoause they have an ex-
ternal oause whioh oan produoe the same speoiffc essenoes 
with different individuating notes. It is true that the very 
essenoe ot the finite beings is responsible for the intrinsio 
possibility of this multiplication, but it is a possibility 
that would never be realized without an extrinsio cause. An 
infinite being, on the other hand, sinoe it has from its very 
essenoe all being that can possibly be had, permits neither 
the intrinsio possibility, nor has an·external cause which 
might produoe the various individuals. 
Suppose now that there should be a neoessary, but finite, 
being. Such a being oould not be individuated by an external 
oause, for in supposing it to be neoessary we exolude the 
possibility of a oause. But there remains the question of 
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intrinsic possibility of multiplication, and thus th~ inves-
tigation is considerably narrowed. The question is resolved 
to this. Does the intrinsic impossibility of multiplication 
in a necessary being equal infinity? It is not clear that 
Suarez may answer this question in the affirmative. He attem,~ 
ted to prove the ~dcity of a necessary being by showing 
, 
that any multiplication, either in number or species, would 
have to be had from something added to the necessity, but 
that this differentiating note can be had neither from some-
thing, that is, some cause, outside the essence, nor trom the 
10 
essence itself. If an external cause gave the differentiation, 
the being would not be necessary. If it came trom the 
necessity of the being, each necessary being would have the 
same note, the same differentiation, which is equivalent to 
saying that there would really be but one necessary being. 
From this considerati~n it appears that a necessary being 
admits of no multiplication, precisely because it is necessarT, 
but it does not appear evident that intensive infinity follows 
un!city., To prove this we have to prove that infinity follows 
necessity, but this is what Suarez has not y&,t clearly 
demonstrated. 
10 The proofs for unicity, together with an evaluation, are 
considered at length in Ch. IV, beginning on page48. 
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To sum up our analysis or this third argument against 
the possibility or intrinsic limitation, we say that, on the 
supposition that tthere is only one necessary being, such a 
being cannot be limited to possessing only some or the per-
rections which are possible, but that it is not clearly es-
tablished that this being must be absolutely unlimited. 
To prove this absolute inrinity Suarez next gives his 
!. priori proor. 
A priori autem solum potest probari per non 
repugnantiam, vel negationem omnis causae, 
vel rationis, ob quam necessitas essendi ut 
sic, potius limitetur ad hoc genus per-
reotionis quam adlaliud, et ad huno gradum 
quam ad melior em. 1 
Berore we proceed to the rurther reasoning that sUbstantiates 
this argument we find a difficulty in what is said. Here 
again he seems to be proving omniperfeotion rather than in-
tensive inrinity. A neoessary being, he states, oannot be 
limited to one genus or perfeotion, nor to one grade or per-
feotion. It oannot be limited to anyone perfection. It 
cannot be limited to any grade or perfeotion we know in 
oreatures, but must possess the creature perrection in a .~ 
higher degree. Godts perreotion, however, may be greater, 
melior, than that or creatures, but does that make it inrinite? 
Berore passing judgement, however, we must consider his rurther 
11 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. XXX, Sec. 2, n.23 
29 
reasoning in this matter. 
We have already oonoeded that the neoessary being oan-
not be limited by an external cause. When Suarez further 
attempts to show that there can b~ .. no intrinsic reason for 
,9 47 
limitation, he seems to do little more than repeat his former 
arguments whioh he termed ~ posteriori • 
••• in omni genere perfeciionis possibilis 
necessarium fuit ut tal is perfeotio 
haberet in ali quo ente intrinseoam 
neoessitatem essendi; ali~s non haberet 
unde initium sumeret, aut ad alia entia 
dimanaret, et idem est de quocumque 
gradu possibili entitativae perfectionis.12 
What more does this say than that every possible perfection 
must have as its source the one, necessary being? There re-
mains the supposition, as yet not proven, that the possibles 
are infinite. There remAins also the difficulty which oomes 
from his considering the possibles as only syncategorematioal-
ly infinite. But we still reserve our judgement in order to 
consider another argument immediately following the preceding. 
Ergo ipsa ratio entis ut sic, postulat 
ut secundum totam suam latltudinem per-
feotionis possibllem, aut vere ex-
cogitabilem, habeat in allquo ente 
necessitatem essendi vel formallter, vel 
eminenter; non potest habere hanc 
necessitatem quasi divisam et partitam 
in plura entia necessaria, ut supra 
12 Ibid. n.23. 
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probatum est; ergo necesse est ut 
illam habeat quasi congregatam tot am 
in uno ente per se necessario, et 13 
hoc ipsum est illud ens esse infinitum. 
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.' 
According to this argument, whatever there is of being must 
be had unparticipated by the first being, and this first 
being by virtue of all that it possesses is infinite. 
But how do we know that being, or !!!!, is of itself 
infinite? :F1N)m:the arguments we have considered it appears 
that Suarez thought being to be infinite because it could be 
participated ad infinitum. But do we know that it can be 
participated ad infinitum? The pos~ibility of infinite par-
ticipation must be proven either from the nature of the un-
participated, or from the infinity of participated beings~ 
Suarez argues mostly from the fact that the possible, par-
ticipated beings are infinite, butj as we have said so fre-
quently, we do not know that the Possibles are infinite until 
we know that their cause is infinite. buarez really gives no 
argument for the infinity of the unparticipated, considered 
in itself, but only assertions. In brief, he proves the im-
possibility of intrinsic limitation for !B! ~ ~ either b,~ 
saying that we know of no limitation, "per negationem 
limitationis", or by showing that ens a se cannot be limited 
---
13 Ibid. n. 23. 
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to anyone created perfection, or even to the same g»ade of 
perfection that creatures have. He, himself, does not seem 
to feel certain that his proofs will satisfy, for he adds 
to his !. priori proof: "!1 revera .!!! haec sufficiens demon-
st'ratio, nisi quis velit voluntarie pertinax ~."l4 
In this criticism our chief point hAS been that Suarez 
has not demonstrated that a pure act of ~, which has no 
oause, is without intrinsio limitation. All his proofs, we 
have said, show only that this aot of ~ does not have the 
limitations whioh 0 reatures have. It must now be added that 
he denies the prinoiple whioh St. Thomas uses to prove the 
infinity of ~ subsistens, but does not substitute a new 
prinoiple. He begins the seotion in whioh he gives 
proofs for infinity by presenting and rejecting the 
St. Thomas. This proof of Thomas was given briefly 
15 
preceding ohapter. Suarez rejects it, thus. 
Ego vero existimo rationem non esse 
effioacem, si in hoc fundetur, quod 
essentia non pot est esse finita, nisi sit 
potentia vere ao proprie reoeptiva ipsius 
esse, et e converso, esse non posse esse 
finitum, nisi sit vere receptum in 
assentia, tamquam in potentia proprie 
passiva et reoeptiva... ut argo esse sit 
finitum satis est ut sit reoeptum ab alia 
14 Ibid. n.23. 
15 cr:-Ch. I, 1'.10. 
his 
proof of 
in a 
in tanta et tanta perfeotionis mensura, ~ 
etiamsi proprie non sit ~~oeptum in 
aliqua potentia passiva.' 
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Note Qaretully the last sentenoe. A limited, or finite aot 
is an imperfeot aot. If God oan produoe an aot whioh, with-
out being reoeived into a potenoy, oan still be limited in 
the very respeot in which it is an act, then that aot must 
have its own intrinsic prinoiple of limitation. For God can 
produce only those beings whioh are intrinsecally possible. 
But if an act can, preoisely in so far as it is aot, have 
an intrinsio limitation, Suarez has no olear right to pos-
tulate that a non-reoeived aot is infinite until he adduoes 
some turther proof for this. 
That Suarez should hold suoh a pos1'ion is to be ex-
peoted trom his stand on act and potenoy in general. Certain-
ly he makes use of these oonoepts;-but he does not use them 
in the striot sense that Thomists employ. Aot and potenoy 
are not oonsidered by him as prinoiples of being; they are 
considered as applying in the striot sense only in the order 
of essenoes. Moreover, even in the order of essenoes potenoy 
is oonsidered not merely as a oapaoity for perfeotion, bu~ 
over and above this as being in itself an imperfeot aot. 
A thorough examination of his whole position on aot and 
16 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysioae, ~.XXX, Seo.2, n.19. 
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potency would be out ot place here. Such a consider~ion 
ot his notions would have to be very lengthy, since he does 
not gather them together in anyone place to lay down definite 
principles. The few statements made about his doctrine, how-
ever, can be justitied. That he does not consider essence to 
be related to ~ as potency to act is evident trom his whole 
disputation concerning the distinction between essence and 
existence. It he identities them, as he clearly does, there 
can be no question of their being distinct principles; there 
can be no composition save in the essence itselt which is 
one and the same as the~. " ••• Dicendum ~ compositionem 
~ ~ !1 essentia, analogice tantum compositionem appellari 
17 quia ~ ~ compositio realis." For Suarez an essence 
really distinct from its!!!! would not be a real being. 
"Repugnat enim ent-1tatem constitui in esse entitatis per 
- 18 ~--
aliquid ~ ~ condistinctum." This opinion, moreover, is 
corroborated by a close follower of Suarel, Descoqs. "The 
composition of act and potency in the proper sense ••• belongs 
19 
uniquely to the order of essence." Maquart, throughout 
his E1ementa Philosophiae, treats the doctrine ot Suarez, ~nd 
+ ~ 
17 Ibid., D. XXXI, Sec. 8, n. 7. 
18 lDIa., Sec. 6, n.2. 
19 ~escoqs, op cit. II, 566. La composition d'acte et de 
puissance au sens propre ••• appartient uniquement ~ ltordre 
de lfessence. 
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explicitly insists that for Suarez subjective potenev is an 
20 
imperfect act. This latter is beyond doubt true in the case 
of prime matter, which Suarez conceives as having its own 
entitative act. "Dicendum ~ ergo l'rimo, materiam.BQ.!l 
vocari puram potentiam respectu omnis actus metaphysici, id 
est, quia nullum actum metaphysicum includit; hoc enim verum 
- 21 - - --
!!!! ~ potest." 
Now, if essence and existence are not to be considered 
as real potency and act, certainly the principle of limitation 
of act by potency will not apply to them. If essence and 
existence are identical, then to say that existence is limited 
by essence is simply to say that existence limits itself. 
" And since all the bei#gs we know from experience are limited, 
some special reason must be found to show that a non-received 
existence is infinite. 
In the particular case of the limitation of ~ which 
we have been considering, the position of Suarez evidently 
follows on his manner of conceiving ~, and its components, 
essence and existence. While he strongly denies that en~ is 
actually univocal, - for that would involve pantheism ~, his 
20 F. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, A. Blot (editor), 
Paris, 1938, III h, 60. 
21 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. 4111, Seo.5, n.g 
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concept seems to be univocal, since it represents all.beings 
only in so far as they are similar, prescinding entirely trom 
their differences. 
Sic ergo explicata hac precisione rationis 
in conceptu objectivo,.non est difficile 
ostendere reperiri in conceptu objectivo 
entisquia per conceptum formalem entis, 
neque Deus neque substantia creata, neque 
accidens representatur, secundum modum 
quo in re sunt; neque prout inter se 
differunt; sed solum prout aliquo mod~ 
inter se conveniunt, ac s1milia sunt. 
Ex his infero primo, in hoc conceptu entis 
objectivo, et sic praeciso non includi 
actu modos intrinsecos substantiae v!t 
aliorum membrorum quae dividunt ens. 
Such a concept of being contains its inferiors only 
24 
potentially. It is obtained by total abstraction, that is 
by abstracting a superior notion from one of its inferiors, 
25 
in the way genus is taken from a species. It is not a de-
termined but an indetermined concept. 
As the concept of being is potential and obtained by 
26 
tot~l abstraction, so is the concept of essence. A concept 
thus prescinded is not a sufficient basis for arguing to a 
real distinction in beings, and, as we know, Suarez explicitlY 
22 Ibid. D. II, Sec. 2, n. 16. 
23 '!DI'Q. n.20. 
24 !DI'Ci. n.2l. 
25 ~quart, OPe cit., II, 8-9. 
26 Ibid. II, 88. 
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denies this real distinction. MOreover, essence, wh~h 
merely prescinds trom existence, contains it potentially, 
and is identified with it in the real order, can be a dis-
tinct, limiting principle only in the logical order. In the 
real order the essence is the limited being. 
Suarez himself does not speak in so many words of ~ 
being conceived by total abstraction, but this follows logical-
ly from his identification of essence and existence. If 
essence and existence are one, then a concept of ~ is had 
by abstracting from its various inferiors. ~uch a concept 
may represent!!!! as unlimited, but this absence of limit is 
really an absence of determination. ~sse, thus prescinded 
............. 
trom all the determinations with which it is identified in 
the real order, can be but an indetermined something, an ab-
straction of the second intention. Descoqs, moreover, in-
sists that such a concept of !!!! is in accord with the mind 
of Suarez. He says that when we conceive!!!! as being in it-
self unlimited we are concerned not with an absence of im-
perfection, but with an absence of determination. 
27 
being which can exist only in the mind. 
We have a 
On such a foundation Suarez logically rejects the 
27 P. Descoqs, Ope cit., II, 837. 
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Thomistic proof. But ought he not substitute someth1»g in 
its place? His arguments. up to now have not been conclusive 
for the existence of an infinite God. One more proof remains, 
however, and this will be considered in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER TV 
INFINITY OF GOD PROVED FROM CREATION 
. 
This final proof is based 0[3 t.o principles: that God 
created the universe, and that c~eation requires an infinite 
power. "~principium est, .1Jeuun habere.!!.m ad creandum ••• 
,.. 
Aliud principium~, ad creandunn requiri virtutem Simpliciter 
1 
infinitam. tf This is certainly a valid approach, an argument 
from an effect to tm nature of Its cause. 'We have already' 
seen that it is one of the proofs used by St. Thomas. What 
must be investigated is whether C)r not ~uarez succeeds in 
clearly proving these two princi}ples which he enuntiates. 
To prove that God produced ~he ~r~d and all beings save 
Himself from nothing, t:;uarez uses :induction and deduction. , ... 
He seems to place his greatest cC)n~idence in the inductive 
argument, which consists in a cOrls:ideration of all beings 
material and spiritual. He firs~ considers the heavenly , 
bodies, then earthly bodies, and finally spiritual sUbstances. 
The heavenly bodies, stars, moon, and sun, must ha.e 
been created because they cannot have being from themselves. 
I ~'. Suarez, Dlsp.u:t~t1ones 14et~ph7~icae, D. XXX, Sec.2, n.15. 
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rrhis is proven by various considerations. J.i'irst of a.1.l the 
planets cannot have existence by virtue of their essenoe, be-
oause there are more noble creatures which do not exist of 
themselves, but depend on God for their very being. "~uia 
~ multo nobiliores coelis ~ sunt absque efficientia, ut 
2 
patet maxi me de homine." For Suarez it is unthinkable that 
lesser beings should have perfections which higher beings do 
not have, especially if it is the case of the highest possible 
perfection, ~ !!.!!. How he demonstrates that man is de-
pendent for his being will be considered a little farther on. 
Secondly, the heavenly bodies oannot move themselves, but re-
quire an external mover. "~quia coeli adeo sunt imper-
fecti, !!:1 indigeat 'motu ~ complementum suarum actionum, ~ 
praeterea extrinseoo motore qui illo& moveat: !.Q quod!.! !!. 
motum ilIum habere !!Q.!! possint; ertSo multo minus verisimile 
3 
est ex se habere esse." Thirdly, there'is the fact that the 
-~- -
heavenly bodies do not constitute a little world of their own, 
but are very much a part of the universe, having effect on 
earthly bodies, as"tor example, the moon on the tides. In 
the time of Suarez, of course, this influence of the heavenly 
bodies was considered to be even greater. The point, however, 
2 Ibid. Sec. 1, n.15. 
3 '!'Si(!'. n. 15. 
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is that since these bodies are so bound up in the w07kings of 
the creatures of earth they must have been made by the same 
cause who produced the earth, and never have had existence 
of themselves. 
Item videmus coelos in omnibu~ suis vir-
tutibus, aspectibus, et motibus, ita 
esse constitutos, sicut expediebat ad 
conservationem inferiorum rerum, et 
earum generationes et corruptiones; ergo 
est evidens argumentum non esse a se sed 4 
conditos fuisse a communi omnium auctore." 
In answer to this last reasoning, however, it might be 
objected that perhaps the heav,enly bodies had existence of 
themselves and were simply fitted into the workings of the 
universe by some supreme being who took it upon himself to 
bring order into disorder. Suarez would probably reply, as 
he does to a similar objection, that this being who took it 
upon himself to order the whole universe must be the ultimate 
final cause-of the whole. The ultimate final cause, however, 
must also be the first efficient cause, and so this being 
who orders must be the one who gives being in the first place. 
"Quia .!!Q!! pot est universum'8\tbernari nisi ab . .!2. cuius .£.Q.!!-
. 5 
silio et potentia conditum tuit." 
This reply of Suarez, however, does not seem cogent 
4 Ibid. n.15. 
5 Ibid. D. XXIX, Sec. 2, n. 9. 
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enough to meet the objection. He argues that the hea~enly 
bodies must be contingent, because God is their final cause 
and, therefore, their efficient cause. But would God have 
to be the final cause if these heavenly bodies were neoessary, 
as the objeotion supposes? It seems neoessary to prove the 
contingenoy of these beings before postulating God as their 
final cause. The mere fact that He orders them is not enough 
to justify calling Him the final cause. We know, for example, 
from human experience that a person may take existing beings 
and join them into an ordered whole without becoming thereby 
the final cause of either the whole or its parts. Suarez 
seems here to suppose that which is yet to be proven, and 
thus not to answer the objection. However, since it will 
appear later that even though we grant to Suarez a proof for 
the creation of all things we know of, he still cannot deduce 
infinity from this, there is no need of delaying longer on 
this. 
Suarez next endeavors to prove that earthly bodies can-
not have existence of themselves. All earthly bodies exist 
as single individuals, and all the individuals that we know 
today are contingent. From this Suarez deduces that the first 
of these species of individuals was brought into being by 
some external cause, and did not have being of itself. For, 
if the first individual of eaoh speoies had had being of itwelf 
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and given being to the oonsequent members, there would be a 
oontradiotion; the first member would be both oontingent, 
as a member of a oontingent speoies, and neoessary, as ex-
isting of itself. Therefore, all members of all existing 
speoies that we know are oontingeft~\ have their being from 
some superior cause • 
••• quia omnes speoies rerum, quae ilIa 
sunt, in suis individuis'iunt; ergo 
in nulla speoie illarum rerum potest 
esse aliquod individuum non faotum, sed 
ex se habens esse: nam haeo esset magna 
differentia,' et maxime essentiale inter 
tale individuum et alia, etsoonsequenter 
non essent eiusdem speciei. 
We see that this whole argument comes to this; oorporeal 
substanoes must be oontingent because we are immediately 
aware of their generations and oorruptions, that is, of their 
not having being of their own right. 
However, as has already been noted, the anoient Greek 
Philosophers, while realizing that the composite beings of 
this earth must have had some cause, thought,.nonetheless, 
that the matter out of whioh these beings were formed was of 
itself necessary. Suarez notes this as an objeotion to his 
tI 
argument. 
.-
Rogo rursus, an materia ipsa faota sit, 
S Ibid., D. XX, Seo. 1, n. lS. 
neone. Et quidem Philosophi fere 
omnes materiam negaverunt esse faotam, 
sed asseruerunt esse ooaeternam Deo, 
et ex se ao omnino neoessario habentem 
esse. In quo errore fuisse StoiC¥s, 
Pythagoreos, et Platonem ipsum ••• 
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.' 
Suarez 1:m:m.ediattly affirms, however, that this is "alienum 
~ ~ rationi naturali, praeter dicta in priori assertione 
8 !l praeter ~ quae communia sunt omnibus entibus creatis." 
And then he shows why prime matter cannot be necessary, but 
must also be the result of creation. First of all, of all 
things which in ~ny way :rejoice in the title, "being", prime 
matter is the most imperfect, and, as such, certainly cannot 
have a perfection which superior beings .. lack. 
Nam oum illa sit infilla omnium sub-
stantiarum etiam corrupt ibilium , in-
credibile est illam habere hanc perfectio-
nem sllmmam , quae est ex se hatlere esse, 
cuius perfectionis aliae species omnes 
rerum generabiliuw, et formae illarum 
non sunt capaces.· .' 
Secondly he places a disjunction. If prime matter is 
necessary and coaeternal with God, in the beginning it either 
had no substantial form, or had one of it.elf. It could not 
have existed without any form because it ,is ordered by its 
very nature to union with a form. without a form it would 
7 Ibid. n.17. 
S T6Tci. n.1S. 
g 'IDI<i. n.1S. 
have been in a preternatural state. 
Primwm dioi non potest quia repugnat 
naturae materiae, nam licet non im-
plicet oontradiotionem, tamen est 
a1i.num a naturali ordine rerum, et 
ideo verlsimile non est materiam 
habere suam entitatem ex se, et tamen 
habere eam in statu praeternaturali, 
et absque ulla formali perfeotione, et]D 
oonsequ~nter absque usu vel utilitate. c 
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On the other hand prime matter could not have existed 
with a substantial form which it had neoessari~y, be'oause 
this would mean not only that prime matter was neoessary, but 
even some oorporeal substance was neoessary. The form, whioh 
prime matter would have had from its very necessity, would 
b~ a necessary form,one which could not be separated from 
the matter, and'as a oonsequence substantial ohange would be 
impossible. 
Si aut habuit formam allquam ex se; 
ergo jam non sola materia, sed quaedam 
substantia integra est ex se habens 
esse. Ex quo u1terius fit, tota ill a 
substantia esse simplioiter neoessaria, 
et tam non posse esse quam ipsam materiam 
primam, quia quod est inde pendens ab 
alio in siO esse, non potest illud 
amittere. ~ 
It oan be objeoted that the disjunotionwhioh Suarez 
plaoed at the beginning of the preceding argument was not 
10 Ibid. n.1B. 
11 lDlCr. n.1B. 
-
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complete. Perhaps prime matter always existed with ~'form, 
but not a necessary form. Perhaps from all eternity God 
supplied it. with some form whereby it might have a natural 
existence. Suarez was prepared for this objection. "Sed 
hoc etiam dici non potest, tum qUi1t 47involvit repugnantiam ••• , 
tum etiam qUia alias ilIa forma ex necessitate naturae manerEtt 
- 12 - - · 
!! Deo." The repugnance would consIst in matter's having 
~ of itself, and yet. not having all that is required for 
~. It would still be necessary, pecause if God supplied 
it freely there would be no reason for its being eternal. 
"Est autem contra rationem naturalem dicere Deum agere extra 
- 13 --
se necessitate naturae." Furthermore, since God conserves 
-. 
by the same act by which He produces, the form, and consequent-
ly the substance, would still be necessary, and substantial 
ohange would 'be impossible. "Et praeterea sequitur qua 
necessitate agi~ ~ illam formam, eadem conservare illam: 
et conse2"uenter materiam!!.! necessitate,seJlper ~ sub i1la 
- 1 
forma." 
Having given these arguments Suarez feels that his case 
fO,r the c-reation. of material beings is strong enough, and he 
.,. 
turns to a consideration of spiritual beings, the rational 
soul and angels. The only argument which can prove the 
12 Ibid. n.19. 
13 Ibid. n.19. 
14 IbId. n.19. 
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creation of angels, on the supposition that there ara'angels, 
is the argument which proves that there can be only one ~ 
~~. This argument can also be applied to the rational soul 
and to all material beings, but before investigating it we 
will consider another proof for the creation of the rational 
soul, which is more similar to the arguments for the creation 
of material beings. (We recall that some of the arguments 
just given depend on this proof that the soul does not have 
being of itself.) 
Man, as composed of matter and form, body and soul, is 
certainly contingent. For we have immediate evidence of his 
generation and corruption, birth and death. But, granted 
that the matter of which he is composed is contingent, what 
about the form? Since the rational form is not educed from 
matter, perhaps it has a preexistent state of being, is in 
itself necessary. Suarez .i8 not at all willing to admit that 
the soul has existence prior to its union with the body. 
"Esset error non solum in fide sed etiam contra rationem 
'15- -----
naturalem." But even if it had, it still would owe its 
whole being to God, would be produced by creation. jlor t"he 
soul by its very nature is ordered to union.with the body, So 
that its separated existence is not natural; and it is not 
15 Ibid. n. 21. 
possible that a being should have its ~ trom its ve;y 
essenoe, end yet not have it in a natural manner. The soul, 
therefore, whioh is not eduoed trom matter and does not have 
existence trom itself oan owe its being only to the oreative 
aot of God. 
Nam etiamsi animae essent ante oorpo~a, 
non tamen essent a se, et sine effioiente: 
quia praeter alias rationes taotas, oum 
anima. sit naturalis forma oorporis, siex 
se neoessario esset, ex aeternitate exis-
teret inf6rmaDdo oorpus: nam res quae ez 
se habet esse non potest habere illud in 
praeternaturali statu ••• Igitur live 
anima informare inoipiat oum oorpure, 
sive ante illud, neoessarium est habere 
oausam effioienxem, et oonsequenter fieri 
per oreationem. 
Before passing on to the argument whioh demonstrates 
that there oan be only one ~ ~ ~ a few words ot comment 
are due to the preceding arguments. First of all, it is to 
be noted that all the arguments for oreation thus tar oon-
sidered prove only that the beings we know must have come 
about through the creative aot ot God. They do not prove th~ 
all possible beings, save God alone, must be either be oreated 
or never oome into existenoe. Seoondly we recall that none 
~ ": 
of ,the arguments prooeed from the very nature of being itself, 
as do the arguments ot St. Thomas. That the argument s do not 
16 Ibid. Seo. 1, n. 21. 
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proceed from the very notion of being, or !!!!, is t~'be ex-
pected in virtue of what has already been seen concerning the 
Suarezian concept of~. Furthermore, as a eonae'quenee of 
this method of arguing, there will be some difficulty in e~­
tablishing the God of creation as infinite in the very "realm 
of being. 
In opposition to the preceding proofs the final proof, 
~ased on the nature of ~ ~~, does intend to prove that 
all possible beings, save God alone, must be produced by God 
from nothing. Briefly, it says that there is one uncaused 
cause, and only one; and that, therefore, whatever else ~ 
must look baQk to this being as source and cause. 
When he is treating creation Suarez states this proof 
in a few words. "Verumtamen ~ illis (rebus immaterialibus) 
nullum fieri potest speciale argumentum praeter illud univer-
!!!! sumptuml;x ~ principio quod repugnat dari plura entia 
improducta.n To get a full treatment of this proof we must 
go to his disputation on the existence of God. 
His first step is to prove that there is one ~ ~ ~. 
After having rejected the prinCiple "Quidquid movetur ••• ", he 
gives another principle which is metaphysical and which will 
17 ~., D. XX, Sec. 2, n. 21. 
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be the basis of his proof. "OnIDe quod fit ab alio fi .. : sive 
18 
oreetur .!.!!.! generetu;-, sive quaoumgue ratione fiat." This 
prinoiple is too evident to require more than a brief ex-
planation. However, before prooeeding to this explanation, 
a few words about the differenoe between the Suarez ian prin-
oiple and the Thomistio "Quidquid movetur" seem in order. In 
expression they seem to oome to the same thing, sinoe the t~~" 
of Suarez and the "movetur" of Thomas seem to express the same 
idea. Suarez himself explains in what he wanted his prinoiple 
to differ from that of Thomas. iJ:'hat being whioh is moved is 
supposed "to already exist, while that whioh beoomes is not 
supposed to have already had existenoe. The being whioh al-
, 
ready exis~s before aoquiring a new perfeotion may-have had 
thatperfeotion virtually, and thus been able to move itself. 
But a being whioh is non-existent ~annot poss"ess its per-
19 feotion virtually, and so requires an effioient oause. In 
view of this reasoning Suarez rejeoted the prinoiple of Thomas, 
as not applying to all eases, and substituted one of his own. 
The prinoiple of Suarez oan be briefly explained. When 
a oreature passes from the realm of non-being to that of being, 
18 Ibid., D. :x:x::tX, S~o. ,1 .. n."'~O. 
19 Ibid., n. 20. 
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it itself can certainly not be,the cause of the transit, for 
that would mean that at the same time it both was and was 
not; in short, it would be its own cause. 
Quod principium ex eo de.monstratur, quod 
nihil potest efficere see Nam res quae 
fit per effectionem acquirit esse: res 
autem quae facit vel producit supponit~r 
habere esse, et ideo claram repugnantiam 
involvit quod idem faciat seipsum: prius 
enim quam res fit, non potest esse in 
act~oformali vel virtuali ad faciendum 
see 
With this principle established the proof is fairly sim-
ple. In syllogistic form it is: 
Every being which exists is either made, 
or not made. 
But, there cannot be, in the production of 
OiIng, either an infinite series of causes, 
or causes which act upon one another as mem-
bers of a circle. 
Therefore, there must be some unmade, or un-
created being. 
Part of the Minor, perhaps, needs further explanation. The 
causes whioh oooperate to produce being would act on one 
another in a circular process, if cause A were to produce B, 
B were to produoe 0, and then 0, in some strange manner, were 
to cause the being of A. That this should happen is evidently 
~ ~ 
impossible. As Suarez points out, this would really be 
equivalent to having a being cause itself. 
20 Ibid., n. 20. 
Huno ergo oirculum dicimus esse im- .' 
possibilem, et aeque repugnantem illi 
principio, omne quod produoitur ab 
alio producitur ••• Nam si res una fit 
ab alia a se faota mediate saltem'zrt 
quasi in virtute efficit se ipsam. 
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Neither oan there be an infinite series of causes Which 
are per!! subordinate. For, unless the series of oauses 
leads to some unoaused being, there is really no. explanation 
of the final effeot. 
Impossibilem est totam oolleotionem 
entium vel oausarum effioientium esse 
dependentem in suo esse et operari: 
ergo necesse est esse in illis aliquid 
independens: ergo non potest in~llo 
progressu in infinitum prooedi. 
If eaoh member of the series is dependent, the series as a 
whole must be dependent; if the series is dependent there 
must be something outside of it whioh sustains it and explains 
23 
the causality. "Nam ••• ~ quod dependet ab alio dependet." 
And yet the supposition is that there is no being outside the 
dependent series whioh explains the being and aotion of the 
series. ~herefore, either there is some independent, uncaused 
being, or there is only contradiotion • 
. Sic ergo impossibile est totam oolleotionem 
entium esse factam, aut totam oolleotionem 
oausarum esse dependentem in agendo, pro-
pria dependentia~4quia posterior oausa 
pendet a priori. 
21 Ibid., n.23. 
22 IOIa., n.26. 
23 ~., n.26. 
24 fbld., n.25. 
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But granted there is an unoaused bein& this is n~t yet 
God, muoh less an i4finite God. Suarez olearly realizes this 
and prooeed to the demonstration, first of one necessary being 
who produoed the visible universe, and seoondly of one being 
who exoludes the possibility of any other, who is unious. 
One oreator of the visible world is deduced from the or-
. 
der in the universe. One being alone must be ruling the world 
to give it the orderly motion it has, the oooperation of ani-
mate and inanimate, rational and irrationa~ beings. V~reover, 
this supreme being oould not order the world so well unless 
he had produced it in the first plaoe. n~ nan poteat uni-
versum gubernari nisi ab ~ cuius consilio ~ potentiA ~_ 
ditum fuit. n25 
He follows up with various a~guments to show why there 
could not be several neoessary beings who cooperated to pro-
26 duce the world, and who now rule it in peaoeful agreement. 
The arguments are suasive, but not exactly metaphysioal and 
doubt- destroying. Therefore it see~ best to pass over these 
considerations and go on to the metaphysical demonstratloR~of 
Deus Unious. 
25 Ibid., D. XXrx,'Seo. 2, n. 9. 
26 iDt[., n. 21-29. 
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Atter having rejected arguments of Soncinas and.~homas 
for the unicity of God Suarez proceeds to his own solution. 
This proof has already been briefly presented in a previous 
27 
chapter. A necessary being does not permit either numeri-
calor speoific multiplication, because any differentiating 
note or specific difference would have to come from the being's 
necessity, and hence should be the same tor each being. Now 
a more thorough explanation is in place. 
First of all it is impossible that a necessary being 
should be multiplied numerically, that there should be many 
individuals of the same species. In such multiplication the 
differentiating notes, that which makes the i,ndividual dis-
tinct from other members of the species, must be outside the 
essence; for otherwise there would be no multiplioation. 
Quia ubicumque ratio communis est mul-
tiplieabilis secundum diversas naturas 
singulares, esto non sit n~eesse singu-
laritatem in re ipsa distingui a natura 
communi, oportet tamen ut aliquo modo 
sit extra essentiam talis naturae, nam 
si esset illl essentialis, revera~alis 
natura non esset multiplicabilis. 
But a necessary being can have no notes or constituents ~~ich 
are not essential to it. "In ente autem improducto impossibile 
27 cf. Dh. III, p.27. 
28 F. Suarez, Dlsputatlones Metaphyslcae, D. XXIX, Sec. 3, 
n. 21. 
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est !!! s1ngula.r1tas ill. .!.!E! essentiam naturae elus . :,,29 The 
reason 1s that the esse ot a necessary belng flows ~=rom Its 
-
essence, and there Is no real!!!! other than a slng"tllar ~. 
"§.!.g ~ .!'!Q.!! !.!! nlsl !!! sigsular1s, ut singularis est. Er-
S.Q. necesse .!!! ut, slngularitss talls naturae .ill etlA!31m de .,!!-
sentia'!!y!, et consequenter !1 talis natura .!!QA slt communi-
30 
cabilis." Whatever a necessary being has must com4119 from its 
essence, and the essence, or the necessity, cannot b4S in po-
tency to various differentiating notes, slnoe this wC!:)uld re-
quire an outside cause to bring about the different lIDlembers 
of the speoies. Thus, at least, Suarez argues for ta"le im-
possibility of numerical multiplication. 
Secondly Suare. argues that there cannot be sev.e9ral 
necessary beings which fall under one genus but diff.er by 
virtue of a specific differenoe. 
Quia sicut in coneeptu essentiali illius 
naturae, quae ex se neoessario esf;, in-
cludi tur singularitas, etiam inoludi tur 
tota essentia talis naturae singularis; 
ergo impossibile est, quod haeo essentia 
entis neoessari1 sit alia et alia... Non 
potest oonstitul in tali vel tal~l rationi 
essentiali, per aliquid additum. 
If there were several necessary beings differing spe~ifieally, 
29 Ibid., n. 21. 
30 !"6'Id., n. 21. 
31 ll):[a., n. 22. 
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.' there would have to b$ some note by which they fliffered. 
They could not differ in so far as neoessary, bE9cause their 
necessity is what is common to eaoh. The speoi~10 differenoe 
would have to be something added to the neoessi~y. No exter-
nal oause oould effect the differenoe, sinoe th~y are them-
selves the sole oause of their being. Neither ~ould the 
speoifio differenoe oome from the necessity, siL1Qe in every 
oase the differenoe would have to 'be the same, Sllld thus there 
would remain but one being. 
This argument of Suarez, however, for the jl~ossibility 
of several neoessary beings differing speoificalLly , is not 
satisfaotory. Suarez insists that from the neo~asity of such 
beings there could oome but one speoific differeallce, and that 
there COUld, therefore, be but one necessary beLng. This 
supposes, however, that the concept of necessity- is univocal 
whiie it seems rather to be analosOus. For all that we know 
it may be of the essence of a necessary being to be multiplied. 
The concept of a necessary being may oontain various individ-
uating notes ~, implicite. 
Moreover, these arguments of Suarez for the 'Unicity of 
a necessary being are not consonant with his own prinoiple 
of individuation. ~piritual beings for him are :individuated 
by their very entity, not by anything else. 
" •• • J?onstat JJl 
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eis ~ posse ~ aliud principiunm indiv1duationis pDaeter 
ipsam uniuscuiusque rei entitatem •• _. ~ sumenda est ab 
32 
accidentibus, ~ est aliud unde sUJ.m.i potest. ft According-
ly he holds that angels of the sames species may be multiplied 
. 
numerically by their distinct entitlttes without any notes added 
to the essence. It would seem to fitollowfrom this that there 
could be several necessary beings ~ilfer1ng not essentially, 
nor in virtue of something added t~ the essence, but only by 
their different entities. ~pecifi~ multiplication would also 
seem possible in this position. FCDr Tholilists angels differ. 
speoifically, and the difference oaan be explained by means 
of the real oomposition of essence and elistence. Suarez, 
however, has no real composition o~ essen~e and existenoe in 
the entity of angels whioh he oan uase to explain speeitic 
differences; for him there is noth1-ng but the entity to ex-
plain the differenoe. To follow thais position logioally he 
,,", 
ought to hold that there oan be sevreral moessary beings 
differing specifioally by virtue or:' their very entities, with-
out any appeal to added notes. 
In the light of this criticismA it cannot be said that 
", 
Suarez has proven that there can be~ but one neoessary being. 
He has rejected potency as the indi-viduating factor, and has 
32 Ibid., D. V, Sec. 6, n. 17. 
-
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thus placee a serious obstacle in his path to provint'the 
unicity of a necessary being. If he cannot demonstrate that 
there is but one necessary being, he oan hardly go on to prove 
that there is a necessary being who is infinite. However, by 
supposing ror the time that he has proven this unicity, it is 
possible to go on and see how he endeavors to show that this 
one neoessary being is infinite. 
At the beginning of this oha.pter two prinoiples were 
given whigh present in brief the proof for infinity from the 
fact of oreation. We have considered one of them, that God 
has the power to create. There remains the second, that cre-
ation requires an infinite power. Suarez endeavors to prove 
this latter in two ways: first, by a consideration of all the 
objects of creation taken collectively; secondly, by an appeal 
to the creation of even one being. 
He proposes the first proof in various ways. God pro-
duced all the different grades of being, and in each grade 
various species. And all this was done by God alone without 
the help of a material cause, or of an assisting secondari 
cause. The conclusion is that God can Jroduce whatever is 
33 
possible, that is, what eyer is not intrinsecal1y repugnant. 
33 ~., D,. XXX, Sec. 2, n. 16. 
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In producing all beings God caused the first es~e which 
any of them had; nothing of being was presupposed in the ob-
jects of His causal activity. Consequently being, or ~, 
is the adequate object of the power of God, and His power ex-
,. .... .34 
tends to everything that can participate being. 
The productive power ot God, moreover, is never exhausted • 
.. No matter how many beings He creates, He can always create 
more; no matter how perfect a being He creates, He can always 
35 
create a more perfect one. -
These three considerations can be brought together, and 
one conclusion drawn. They all say the same thing. The power 
of God extends to all possible beings and perfections, which 
beings and perfections are infinite in number am variety.' 
The conclusion: therefore, God is infinite. 
But here again is the difficulty so freq~ ntly referred 
to in the eXamination of the other proofs for infinity. What 
justification is there for postulating that the objeots ot 
God's power are infinite in number aDd perfeotion, until we 
know that God is infinite? Suarez, at least, gives no proof 
for the infinity of the possibles, and so, in proportion as 
34 Ibid., n. 16. 
35 !'DId., n.16. 
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.' he depends on the infinite possibles, he fails to establish 
clearly the infinity of God. To forestall objections it must 
be noted that from the infinity of the Possibles Suarez in-
tends to prove that God is categorematically infinite, not 
merely syncategorematically infinite. "~egue pot est virtus 
1!!! ~ infinita syncategorematice, ~~ simul ~ actu 
~ 
habet existentem t~ ~ virtutem~~erfectionem." It 
it be recalled again that Suarez conside~s the possibles only 
syncategorematically infinite, his position is rendered more 
difficult. 
There is, however, one instance Inwhieh Suarez makes 
no appeal to the infinity of possible perfeotions. The 
creation of even one being, he says, requires an infinite 
power. 
Et hoc etiam modo existimo satis pro-
bari posse talem potentiam non modo 
ut se extendit ad omne ereabile, sed 
etiam ut determinata ad er~~ndttm quod-
libet ens, esse infinitam. 
Why does the creation of even one being require an infinite 
power? St. Thomas argued that the farther reduced trom act 
a being was, the greater was the power required to bring it 
into being. For example, greater power is required to heat 
36 Ibid., D. XX, Sec. 2, n. 4. 
37 Ibid., n. 6. 
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water than air because the potency of the water is fapther 
away from the act of heat than is the potency of air. If' , 
then, a being was infinitely distant from act, - and such is 
the case of non-being, or nothing t which has no passive potency 
whatsoever, - an infinite active power was required to produce 
38 
the being. But this reasoning did not satisty Suarez. 
First of all he did not believe that non-being was infinitely 
39 
distant from being, but only indefinitely distant. Further-
more, he did not see why an infinite power was required to 
produce a being from no passive potency • 
••• quia independentiaactionis a subjecto 
non videtur esse tanti momenti, nec tan-
tam indi~are perfectionem, ut requirat in 
agent. virtutem infinitam simpliciter. 
Cur e~~~tm? Nam concursus materiae quid 
finitum est. Cur ergo suppleri non poterit 
per virtutem agentis superioris ordinis~O 
et perfectioris, esto infinita non s,it? 
How, then, did he conolude that an infinite power was 
required to create even one being? His explanation was that 
an efficient cause which produced a being without any assist-
ance from either pre-existing matter, or from any superior 
cause, was necessarily infinite. 
Alio item modo potest intelligi potentia 
creandi, quae habet vim se sola, et abs-
que dependentia vel concursu alterius 
38 T. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, c. 43. 
39 F. Suarez, Dlsputatlones Metaphysicae, D. XX, Bec. 2, n. 26. 
40 Ibid., n. 8. 
ali quid ex nihi10 producere ••• talis- .' 
que independeiiia infinitam requirit 
perfectionem. 
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His position comes to this. Creation ultimately requires an 
infinite power, but not every cause which creates is of 
necessfty infinite. God may use an.instrument, in which ease 
the instrument will not be infinite. 
But why does the first cause of creation have to be in-
finite when it acts entir$ly independently of any superior 
cause? To this question the author could find no answer either 
in the text of Suarez, or in the commentaries on Suarez. 
Suarez promises to give an answer in his treatmen~ of the con-
cursus of God with all secondary causes, in Disputation XXII; 
but if it is there, it is presentej obscurely. No explicit 
mention is made. 
And so on the one point where Suarez might be expected 
to give a clear demonstration of the infinity of God we are 
left without an answer that satisfies. What is actually said 
in this final proof, aside from the supposition that the unicit 
of a necessary being has been demonstrated, cannot be oba~cted 
to, but neither can it be said to prove conclusively until 
further evidence is discovered. 
41 ~., n. 4. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered all the arguments that Suarez 
presents for the infinity of God. They were found to fall 
into two general classes, one from the notion of ~ A ~, 
one trom the fact of creation. When Suarez reasoned from 
the notion of the Supreme Being he either arrived only at 
the omniperfection of God, that is, the extensive infinity, 
or failed to sufficiently sUbstantiate his arguments. He re-
jected the Thomistic limitation of act by potency alone, and 
failed to substitute arguments that would prove God to have 
no intrinsic limitation. 
The argument trom creation also failed to prove Godts 
intensive infinity. First of all Suarez did not clearly 
demonstrate that there can be but one necessary being, and 
thus was unable to prove conclusively the fact ot creation. 
Moreover, even on the supposition that creation was a proven 
fact, his arguments for infinity fell short of the mark. On 
the other hand, he again rejected Thomistic arguments and 
failed to substitute satisfactory reasoning of his own, 
In conclusion it must be noted that this pape~emphasized 
primarily the fact that the proofs of Suarez are inconclusive 
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as they stand. Whether or not such proofs are completely 
beyond the scope of Suarez ian philosophy remains an open 
question, but in the light of the evidence produced it does 
seem impossible to deduce the infinity of God from Suarezian 
principles. Moreover, it is highly improbable that a scholar 
as great as Suarez would have failed to find these arguments, 
if they were actually contained in his principles. 
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